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ABSTRACT 
From the beginnings of the Cold War until the présent the Canadian Navy has been a one océan 
fleet, postured primarily to supply anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in the Atlantic. Various plans, including the 1987 White Paper on defence, to give 
the Navy more balance in terms of its areas of opération, mix of forces and missions, hâve been largely 
unsuccessful. The main reason for this is that the NATO maritime rôle has been directly related to the 
long-standing Canadian foreign policy objective of participating in this multilatéral Alliance. In addition, 
forces earmarked for NATO's Atlantic Command (ACLANT) could also be used for North American 
maritime rôles in coopération with the United States Navy (USN) and for non-military sovereignty 
protection tasks. Récent dramatic changes in the international security environment combined with 
domestic budgetary pressures are likely to resuit in a continuation of this Atlantic orientation in 
Canadian naval policy. 
KEY WORDS: Canadian Navy, NATO, collective defence. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Une flotte confinée à un seul océan: la politique navale canadienne dans l'Atlantique 
Depuis le début de la guerre froide jusqu'à nos jours, la marine canadienne constitue une flotte 
confinée à un océan, se consacrant avant tout à la guerre anti-sous-marine au service de l'Organisation 
du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) dans l'océan Atlantique. Divers plans, incluant le Livre blanc sur la 
défense de 1987, visant à rétablir l'équilibre au niveau des aires d'opération de la marine canadienne 
ainsi qu'au niveau de la puissance navale et de ses différentes missions, ont été jusqu'à date 
infructueux. La principale raison de cette situation est que le rôle maritime de l'OTAN a été directement 
relié à l'objectif de la politique étrangère canadienne, en vigueur depuis longtemps, consistant à une 
participation active dans cette alliance multilatérale. De plus les forces affectées au Commandement 
allié de l'Atlantique de l'OTAN (ACLANT) pouvaient aussi être utilisées pour des rôles maritimes nord-
américains en coopération avec la marine américaine ainsi que pour des tâches non militaires reliées à 
la protection de la souveraineté. De récents changements dramatiques au niveau de la sécurité 
internationale combinés à des restrictions budgétaires domestiques vont probablement faire en sorte 
que l'orientation atlantique de la politique navale canadienne va se poursuivre. 
MOTS-CLÉS: Marine canadienne, OTAN, défense collective. 
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Table 1 
Relevant Acronyms 
ACLANT North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Atlantic Command 
ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Alliance 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
CANLANT Canadian Atlantic Area 
CICLANTFLT Fleet Opérations Control Centre of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Atlantic Fleet 
DSR Défense Structure Review 
GPF General Purpose Frigate 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
LRPA Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MARCOM Maritime Command 
NAORPG North Atlantic Océan Régional Planning Group 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NORAD North American Air Defence Command 
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force 
RCN Royal Canadian Navy 
RN Royal Navy 
SAC Stratégie Air Command 
SACLANT Suprême Commander 
SCEAND House of Commons Standing Committee on Extemal Affairs and National 
Défense 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLCM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile 
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System 
SSB Conventionally Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines 
SSBN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSN Nuclear Powered Attack Submarines 
START Stratégie Arms Réduction Talks 
USAF United States Air Force 
USN United States' Navy 
INTRODUCTION 
The key élément of the defence policy announced in the June 1987 Canadian White 
Paper (Canada, 1987) was the création of a "modem and effective","well balanced", "three 
océan" Navy. 
The Minister of National Defence told the House of Commons that the Navy was "on 
the verge of rust out". Its youngest ship was being built at the time of the previous White 
Paper in 1971, and the oldest was commissioned in the 1950s. A three océan navy was 
necessary, the government argued, because Canada now had growing maritime security 
interests in the Pacific and the Arctic, as well as in the Atlantic where it had heretofore 
concentrated its naval efforts. To operate more effectively in ail three océans, the White 
Paper proposed to balance the fleet by adding to its traditional surface and air anti-
submarine (ASW) forces ten to twelve nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). 
This new, modem, effective three océan fleet was not to be. In April 1989, the Mulroney 
government cancelled the SSN program and severely eut the defence budget, ail but 
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repudiating the White Paper. But the intense, albeit brief, debate it touched off about the 
rôles and missions of the Navy drew attention to the overwhelmingly Atlantic orientation of 
Canadian naval policy. Despite the fact that Canada is a trading nation bordered by 
three océans with the longest coastline in the world, it is security and political considérations 
in the Atlantic which hâve almost exclusively determined the maritime forces Canada has 
maintained. 
This paper examines the impact of the Atlantic orientation on the Canadian Navy in the 
post 1945 period. It argues that it was stratégie and especially political considérations 
relating to security in Europe as expressed in Canada's participation in NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization), as opposed to exclusive Canadian maritime interests, or even North 
American defence, which determined the Navy's posture in the Cold War and beyond. An 
important reason why this was acceptable was that the NATO-oriented Navy meshed well 
with continental and national rôles in the Atlantic. In part, this explains why the ambitious 
naval building program of the White Paper floundered and ultimately went under. To be sure, 
a contributing factor was récent dramatic changes in East-West relations. Indeed the paper 
concludes that precisely because the Navy has known no other orientation than Atlanticism, 
thèse récent trends are so germane to the very future of Canada's maritime forces. 
CANADA AND THE NATO MARITIME ALLIANCE 
The govemment and other supporters of the White Paper's naval building, stressed 
Canada's many maritime interests. In addition to having the longest coastline in the world, 
the new Law of the Sea's 200 mile Exclusive Economie Zone will bring vast océan areas 
under Canada's jurisdiction with fishing areas extending even further. Ottawa has also 
claimed ail the internai waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest passage. 
As a trading nation Canada dépends heavily upon transoceanic shipping in the Atlantic and 
increasingly in the Pacific. 
As extensive as its maritime interests hâve been, thèse interests cannot account for the 
posture of the Navy since 1945. The purpose of the Canadian Navy has not been to protect 
exclusive Canadian économie or sovereignty interests at sea. Rather it has been to 
contribute to the maritime portion of the West's collective déterrent posture. This situation is 
not unique to Canada. If seapower corresponded to national économie dependence upon 
the océans, then both the United States and the Soviet Union would hâve much smaller 
navies and other states more dépendent on the seas would hâve larger ones. In reality, the 
navies of the superpowers are based upon military considérations ranging from the 
deployment of stratégie nuclear weapons at sea, to the need to secure or deny use of the 
sea to the opposing side in the event of a war in Europe, to traditional gunboat diplomacy in 
the Third World. Even the modem naval building programs of such important shipping and 
trading nations as the Scandinavian countries and the West European NATO allies, hâve 
been driven more from appréhensions about a Soviet threat, on land as well as sea, than as 
a resuit of exploitation of the seas, even for shipping. As John J. Clark observed in 1967, the 
need for naval forces arises because of military considérations and "persists [...] 
independently of the flux of trade [...]. If merchant shipping were no longer to ply the sea 
lanes, naval présence would still be considered necessary for the free world" (Clark, 1967, 
p. 164). 
At the end of the Second World War Canada had the third largest navy in the world. As 
early as 1943, the Naval Staff was planning for a postwar balanced fleet to encompass a 
wide range of capabilities. But even though Canada's transoceanic trade and fishing 
302 CAHIERS DE GÉOGRAPHIE DU QUÉBEC, Vol. 34, no 93, décembre 1990 
industries expanded during the postwar économie boom, the Navy was drastically reduced 
as part of the massive demobilization that affected ail the forces during thèse years. 
In January 1947, the Government eut $50 million from the naval estimâtes and reduced 
manpower ceiling to 7 500 and by 1948 the fleet numbered forty-four vessels including one 
aircraft carrier, two cruisers, eighteen frigates and destroyers and nine minesweepers 
(Hobson, 1986, p. 15). 
In the past, Canada had relied upon the Royal Navy (RN) for protection. Now there was 
American seapower which, in the words of U.S. Admirai Chester Nimitz, was "more absolute 
than ever possessed by the British [...] so absolute that it is sometimes taken for granted" 
(Till, et al., 1982, p. 56). It was taken for granted because the only immédiate threat came 
from the Soviet Union whose naval forces were no match for United States Navy (USN) and 
was postured for coastal defence rather than highseas combat. In any case, the advent of 
nuclear weapons seemed to make navies superfluous in any future conflict with the USSR. 
How could there be enough time for seapower to take its affect, where war was 
characterized by stratégie bombing by nuclear weapons? Nations, their land and air forces, 
as well as their économies would "disappear in the first blows" (Brodie, 1967, p. 225). 
The obituaries of seapower written in the early days of the nuclear âge proved 
spectacularly prématuré. Nuclear propulsion and especially the deployment of nuclear 
weapons at sea endowed maritime forces with a power and stratégie significance 
unmatched even when Britannia ruled the waves. American aircraft carriers quickly acquired 
a rôle in atomic war plans. The late 1950s saw the advent of the ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN) with its sea-launched ballistic missiles, the capital ship of the new âge. But in 
addition to their nuclear strike rôles, naval forces also retained their traditional tasks of 
securing the seas for reinforcement and resupply of conventional land and land-based air 
forces. This was especially the case with NATO. Although the Alliance is often viewed 
almost exclusively in terms of its land forces and the nuclear déterrent, it was very much a 
maritime alliance from the beginning. 
Maritime coopération among the United States, Britain and Canada did not cease at the 
end of World War II. With the establishment of NATO in 1949, this coopération expanded to 
include other allied nations and became formalized within the framework of the Alliance's 
régional planning groups, especially the North Atlantic Océan Régional Planning Group 
(NAORPG). In 1952, NATO established Atlantic Command (ACLANT) under a Suprême 
Commander (SACLANT) as part of its integrated military command structure. 
The Alliance's maritime strategy during thèse early years was a broad and 
comprehensive one; allied navies had to be ready to support the exercise of power ashore in 
a war of indeterminate length and character. This meant préparations to use the full range of 
capabilities from nuclear strikes by U.S. carrier-based aircraft, to offensive action against 
Soviet forces to the escort of military and civilian convoys. While Soviet forces were weak, it 
was expected that their submarines and land-based naval aviation would be able to mount a 
serious challenge to allied control of the seas around the European mainland. Thus the 
allied maritime strategy was, from the beginning, one of forward defence. As then-Chairman 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley described NATO maritime tasks to 
the Secretary of Défense in 1951: "The Northeastern Atlantic and Mediterranean are 
forward areas in which the level of hostile action would be relatively high and in which 
the active support of opérations on the continent is extremely important" (United States, 
1951). 
Unlike the land and air forces which were deployed into Europe in the wake of the 
outbreak of the Korean War allied naval forces were not permanently part of combined 
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forces. Contributing nations agreed to earmark certain ships and aircraft in the event of a 
crisis or war. Allied naval commanders such as SACLANT had a permanent staff and 
conducted numerous joint exercises, but strictly speaking they were admirais without f leets. 
However, SACLANT and his subordinate commanders were often dual-hatted, in that they 
commanded national forces in addition to their combined allied responsibilities. Thus 
SACLANT was also commander of the powerful American 2nd Fleet in the Atlantic, while his 
deputy was a major commander in the RN. In the course of undertaking their national rôles, 
the allied navies did cooperate by patrolling national seas and areas for which they had been 
given responsibility under ACLANT. There was also a close and continuai sharing of 
information on Soviet naval and air movements. 
Beginning with the NAORPG meetings in 1949 and with the création of ACLANT, 
Canada committed itself to supplying ASW convoy-escort forces as its contribution to 
NATO's maritime posture. In addition to the earmarking of almost ail its Atlantic forces to 
SACLANT, Canada was given responsibility for a large area of the North Atlantic stretching 
out from its eastern coastal waters reaching to almost mid-ocean (approximately 40 
degrees longitude) and southward from Nova Scotia to approximately 40 degrees latitude. 
Initially, the RCN and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) shared command of the 
CANLANT area under ACLANT. Significantly, although North America was part of the 
overall NATO area, allied naval coopération did not extend to the Pacific. Hère, Canada also 
assumed responsibility for an area off its western coast, but under strictly bilatéral 
arrangements with the United States. 
The commitment to NATO saved the RCN from oblivion in the nuclear âge by providing 
it with a sound stratégie rôle since the defence of Europe did require maritime forces of a 
kind Canada could contribute. But it was political, as opposed to purely stratégie 
considérations which were the deciding factor. The importance of the NATO multilatéral 
framework to Canada's political leaders meant that at sea, as on land and in the air in 
Europe, Ottawa was prepared to maintain relatively large forces in peace time as Canada's 
contribution to allied security and unity and as the price that had to be paid for maintaining a 
seat at the table. As Brian Cuthbertson has noted: "Once the Canadian government 
committed forces to Europe and made Europe the stratégie frontier of Canadian defence, 
then the maintenance of secure sea communications across the Atlantic was a sine qua 
non" (Cuthbertson, 1977, p. 127). 
To a certain extent NATO's naval contributions were more attractive than its 
contributions to allied land and air forces. The latter held great political significance because 
they put Canadian forces in Europe, where NATO wanted them. But they there were also 
high costs associated with foreign basing. In contrast, Canada could commit nearly its entire 
fleet to Alliance ASW rôles, while keeping it stationed at Halifax. And thèse forces could also 
be used for North American maritime rôles, which were also heavily ASW oriented (see 
below), while the présence of naval forces helped assert Canadian sovereignty. At this time 
the naval tasks of national sovereignty protection and the continental defence of North 
America and NATO were nearly indistinguishable. Thus that a predominately NATO-ASW 
fleet was superimposed upon the small balanced was "natural and logical". In the 1950s, as 
Cuthbertson observes, "Canadian naval policy and expérience meshed into NATO strategy 
with an ease not présent in other areas of defence activity" (Cuthbertson, 1977, p. 127). 
Expenditures on naval forces rose as part of the gênerai Canadian rearmament during 
thèse years, although the RCN remained third as compared to the Army and the RCAF. 
Between 1951 and 1957, naval spending increased by 167 percent and continued to rise 
over the following several years (Middlemiss, 1988, p. 262). By 1957, the fleet included one 
carrier, with fighters and ASW aircraft, one cruiser, 34 destroyers and frigates as well as 86 
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smaller ships. By the early 1960s, with declining defence spending, non-ASW units, such as 
cruisers, fighter-aircraft and minesweepers were phased out, and the Navy concentrated on 
its specialization in the NATO context. Without NATO, the Navy would hâve had difficulty 
justifying even its ASW assets, let alone other maritime capabilities associated with a more 
balanced fleet. 
The political importance of trans-Atlantic ties also explains the lack of emphasis on the 
Pacific, despite the fact that it was hère, during the Korean War, that the Navy participated in 
its first (and only) hot war since 1945. Shortly after the North Korean attack, Canada sent 
ships to support United Nations forces. But the conduct of the war, especially the 
disagreements that arose with the United States over war aims and the intervention of the 
Peoples Republic of China, persuaded Ottawa to be wary of participation in limited wars of 
containment. Furthermore, Canada did not choose to participate in the Asian régional 
alliance structures created by the United States in the 1950s, not even the ANZUS 
(Australia-New Zealand-United States) Treaty. In the absence of trans-oceanic political 
commitments in the Pacific, there was no impetus for either providing more balance to the 
existing naval deployments or acquiring new ships for a Pacific fleet. 
THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA 
The largely Atlantic orientation of the Navy meshed well with the expanding ties with the 
United States in continental defence during the Cold War years. In air defence, increasing 
bilatéral coopération led to the establishment of NORAD (North American Air Defence 
Command) in 1958. Less well known were the developing links between the Canadian Navy 
and the USN. Canadian ships still flew the White Ensign and belonged to "Her Majesty". but 
the old relationship with the Royal Navy became more distant when an American Admirai 
served as SACLANT, and when the RCN was involved in North American defence. Although 
formally part of the NATO area, collective defence hère, as in continental air defence, was 
an exclusively bilatéral affair. 
No formai joint arrangements comparable to NORAD were established. The measures 
that the RCN undertook to provide continuai surveillance of Canadian waters, especially in 
the CANLANT area and the earmarking of forces for SACLANT, were a sufficient basis for 
coopération with the USN. Both Canada and the United States had an interest in identifying 
and locating Soviet maritime forces, in particular submarines and intelligence ships, in North 
American waters. The USN deployed an ocean-floor sensor array off the eastern seaboard 
as part of its global Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and the RCN had some access to 
this information. In 1959, Canada took over the USN research establishment at Shelbume, 
Nova Scotia and shared information from air and sea patrols with the United States. 
Although institutionally separate, there were links between RCN/USN maritime 
opérations and those of the RCAF/United States Air Force (USAF) in NORAD. The USN 
supplied picket ships for NORAD and information on Soviet air and naval movements in the 
Atlantic was regularly passed from the Fleet Opérations Control Center of the Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CICLANTFLT) to NORAD. The two commands also conducted 
joint exercises, such as the DESK TOP séries. To this extent NORAD/CINCLANTFLT 
coordination was an important, if informai, nexus and link between European and North 
American security. 
The close and continuai working relationship between the two navies in the Atlantic 
became évident during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The USN had begun to prépare for 
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possible action against Cuba even before Président Kennedy announced the imposition of a 
quarantine and the RCN was aware of thèse movements. As then Vice-Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Jeffry Brock recalls in his memoirs, "the action of the White House and the Pentagon 
automatically impinged upon Canadian activities and particularly on the prudent disposition" 
of Canadian ships (Brock, 1983, pp. 108-109). Without waiting for officiai Cabinet approval, 
the RCN commander in the Atlantic reorganized his command for war, sending as many 
ships as possible to sea. Canadian ships and aircraft conducted patrols out into the Atlantic 
as part of a submarine and air barrier and also covered areas left open as USN forces 
moved southward. After the crisis, the Americans thanked the RCN's Atlantic Fleet 
Commander for his "outstanding support" with CINCLANTFLT noting in his annual report 
that RCAF's "surveillance assistance and coopération in ASW throughout the crisis 
contributed significantly to the ASW effort. Without this valuable assistance much of 
the Western Atlantic area would not hâve been adequately covered"(United States, 1963, 
CINCLANTFLT, p. 30). 
For the most part, maritime surveillance of the approaches to North America was 
directed against Soviet attack submarines and thus meshed well with the tactical ASW 
emphasis of NATO. By the early 1960s, the Soviet Hôtel and Golf class conventionally-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSB) were patrolling in the Western Atlantic. They 
carried SS-N-4 SARK and SS-N-5 SERB missiles with ranges of 350 and 700 nautical miles 
respectively. At this time, the USSR lacked a land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) capability to match the United States and thèse first SLBMs were the only missiles 
able to strike at North America. Toward the end of the décade, the Soviets deployed Yankee 
class SSBNs carrying the SS-N-6 SAWFLY SLBM with a range in excess of 1 300 nautical 
miles. By patrolling off the coasts, the Yankees gave the USSR the capability to hit important 
targets in North America, in particular U.S. Stratégie Air Command (SAC) bases and 
command and control facilities from the sea. By this time, the Soviets had also acquired an 
ICBM force which was believed to be earmarked for urban centres and military targets deep 
inland, while the Yankees appeared to be allocated to soft coastal targets. 
Although there was no defence against an SLBM once fired, there was a requirement to 
monitor the movement of SSBNs, in the same manner that NORAD provided surveillance of 
bombers and ICBMs. As the 1961 report of the RCN's ad-hoc committee on naval 
objectives (the Brock Report) noted, "any progress that can be made, and demonstrated, 
towards early détection, identification and tracking of launching submarine will pay 
dividends. This will also contribute to the protection of the déterrent in the form of the West's 
retaliatory strike capability" (Canada, 1961, p. 71). Given the existing close coopération 
between the RCN and USN, the advent of Soviet ballistic missile submarines simply added a 
new dimension to bilatéral naval coopération. From the beginning, this stratégie ASW (ASW 
directed against SSBs and SSBNs) was also coordinated with NORAD through 
CINCLANTFLT. The CAN US SLAMEX exercises tested the ability of air and naval forces 
from both countries to "conduct coordinated défensive opérations against a submarine-
launched missile threat to the east coast of North America" (United States, 1965, 
CINCLANTFLT, p. 24). 
Even when the Soviets introduced newer submarines, with SLBM ranges capable of 
striking the United States from waters near the USSR, some older and newer classes of 
SSBNs continued to patrol off the North American coasts. Thus, the Commander of 
MARCOM told a Senate committee in 1982, Canada performs a surveillance rôle against 
Soviet SSBNs in both the Atlantic and Pacific "in conjunction with U.S. forces" (Byers, 1983, 
p. 12). 
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There were limits to bilatéral naval coopération. The stratégie defence of North 
America was not a high priority for the USN. Although its forces could be found in the 
seaward approaches to the United States, especially SSNs hoping to trail American SSBNs 
as they left port, the vast majority of the Soviet Navy remained closed to the Eurasian 
landmass. While the USN's ties to the Canadian Navy were close, they were not extensive 
relative to other global links. In addition, some information, especially on the movement of 
American submarines, was only passed to Canada on a need to know basis. The sharing of 
information was very much related to how much Canada contributed. In gênerai, the Navy 
maintained about twice as many ASW escorts on the East coast (in addition to its single 
carrier) as it did in the Pacific. Thus in the Atlantic, where the NATO command arrangement 
existed, there was a much broader exchange. As former Deputy MARCOM Commander 
Rear-Adrmiral F.W. Crickard told a Parliamentary Committee in 1985: "It is noteworthy that 
Canada is the beneficiary of much more data from the American undersea monitoring 
System in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, where Canada does not [...] share in the burden of 
underwater surveillance apart from periodic [...] air patrols. The message is clear: 
participation in joint opérations opens doors to intelligence that would otherwise be closed 
to Canada" (Canada, 1985, p. 50:40). 
RE-EXAMINING THE FLEET: THE BROCK REPORT, UNIFICATION AND REVIEW 
The unbalanced, largely NATO-ASW, orientation of the Canadian Navy was critieized in 
the Brock Report. It was a "cardinal fact", the Report stressed, that some form of collective 
security is essential to Canada. Accordingly "the RCN will rarely if ever operate without the 
support of one or more of our allies". However, Canada needed more balanced and flexible 
maritime forces "to support our country's external policies". The emphasis upon NATO and 
coopération with the USN and the Royal Navy was correct, but the resuit was that "our 
defence policy provides planned support for external policies only with regard to NATO: for 
anything else, expediency is the answer" (Canada, 1961, pp. 15, 69-70). The report 
suggested that the Navy in particular needed a greater capability to support Canadian 
military opérations outside the North Atlantic région in "other than a European type of war", 
the most likely conflict scénario given the existence of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it 
recommended that Canada acquire, in addition to new gênerai purpose frigates to fulfil 
NATO rôles, a fleet of "Heliporter Frigates", capable of transporting troops and airlifting 
them to landing areas using shipborne helicopters. 
The Brock Report also argued that Canada needed a more sophisticated and larger 
submarine force, even suggesting that nuclear-powered attack submarines be acquired by 
the early seventies. In addition, it drew attention to the need to assert Canadian sovereignty 
in ail three of its océans, especially in the Arctic and suggested the acquisition of research 
vessels to operate in the North. Many of the concerns raised by the Brock Report, such as 
the almost exclusive NATO orientation of the fleet, the need for greater mobility and 
flexibility and the importance of asserting sovereignty at sea, would find their way into the 
1964 and 1971 White Papers on Defence. However, the fleet envisioned by the report, like 
that of the 1987 White Paper, was never to be. 
In March of 1962, the Cabinet accepted one of the recommendations that had corne 
out of the Brock Report, for eight General Purpose Frigates (GPF). For the Navy, this was 
part of an effort to move away from its ASW specialization towards a more balanced fleet. 
With the change of government in 1963, ail current programs were reviewed by the new 
Minister Paul Hellyer. Because of rising cost estimâtes for the GFP and because he 
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supported a specialized ASW Navy, he cancelled the program. In its place, the government 
decided to construct four Tribal class ASW helicopter-destroyers, the DDH-280s. 
The perpétuation of a specialized ASW Navy appeared to be at odds with the thrust of 
the 1964 White Paper and especially with the plans for unification. In justifying unification of 
the Armed Forces, Hellyer pointed to benefits that would arise from having highly mobile 
and flexible forces combining air, sea and ground units. Such forces, according to Hellyer, 
would be available to meet the needs of peacekeeping and "brush-fire wars and related 
missions" (Hellyer, 1967, p. 3). 
But as with the Brock Report's justification for Heliporter frigates for limited war 
contingencies, this rationale for unification seemed to hâve no relationship to the likely tasks 
which the Navy, or any other branch of the Armed Forces would ever be required to 
undertake. The Navy did support foreign policy. Yet it was unclear what Canadian foreign 
policy would require thèse kinds of intervention forces, especially when they were suited for 
non-NATO contingencies? Since Korea (and until the August 1990 dispatch of three 
Canadian ships to the Persian Gulf), the Canadian government had indicated its great 
reluctance to become involved in limited wars in the Third World. Sometimes, as in the case 
of the Suez opération, peacekeeping required logistical support from the Navy. But this did 
not entail the landing of Canadian troops against hostile fire from shore. As David Burke 
observed of this rationale for unification: "Canada's world-wide intervention force was 
literally ail dressed up with nowhere to go [...]. Canada had a structurally unified defence 
force without a mission to match" (Burke, 1986, p. 2). Ail the turmoil of unification 
notwithstanding, Ottawa was still committed to supplying discrète air, land and sea units to 
NATO and for North American defence. For the Navy and for the naval air forces heretofore 
attached to the RCAF, this meant that the Atlantic-ASW orientation remained unchanged. 
This became évident during the Trudeau defence review of 1968-69 leading up to the 
1971 White Paper. In April 1969, the Prime Minister complained that NATO had corne to 
détermine "ail our defence policy" and our defence policy had corne to détermine "ail our 
foreign policy" and thus Canada had "no foreign policy except that which flowed from 
NATO" (Stewart, 1982, p. 21). He set about trying to change this. Henceforth foreign policy 
would be the extension abroad of domestic priorities and so, it appeared, would defence 
policy. The most important décision was to eut in half the size of Canada's land and air 
forces in Europe. Consistent with this approach was the emphasis, repeated in the White 
Paper, placed upon sovereignty protection directed against non-traditional military threats. 
For the Navy, the apparent shift in defence policy was especially important. Since the 
early 1950s, its posture had been NATO-driven, in particular the provision of ASW-forces for 
the protection of allied SLOC in the event of a war in Europe. Thèse forces had also been 
employed in North American maritime defence rôles, including surveillance directed against 
SSBNs. The 1971 White Paper maintained the earmarking for naval forces for NATO, but 
indicated that the "degree of emphasis" on stratégie ASW would be "reduced in favour of 
other maritime rôles" (Canada, 1971, p. 28). It was évident that thèse other rôles would be 
more national and non-military in orientation. In its 1970 report on maritime forces, the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence 
(SCEAND) also called for reducing anti-SSBN opérations with the United States. With 
regard to the NATO rôle, it concluded that "no need for convoy protection can be envisaged 
in any likely eventuality". Consistent with the new emphasis on sovereignty, the committee 
pointed to the need to augment "for commercial and other reasons" the Navy's policy 
functions as a "manifestation of national sovereignty". Moreover, since the countries most 
likely to challenge Canadian sovereignty included the United States and other NATO allies, 
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SCEAND argued that "Canadian maritime forces must be capable unilaterally of carrying 
out any increased police functions" (Canada, 1970, pp. 17, 19). 
The declaratory shift in emphasis from collective defence rôles to sovereignty 
protection did not, however, hâve any substantive impact upon the rôles or posture of the 
Navy. For although the Trudeau government appeared to downgrade NATO-Atlantic and 
North American missions, Canada did not withdraw from any of its responsibilities. The Navy 
did undertake to improve its patrol of fishing areas and search and rescue capabilities. 
Nevertheless, it was unclear from the beginning what amount of effort MARCOM was to 
dévote to non-military sovereignty tasks as opposed to the traditional alliance-oriented task. 
Nor was the "appropriate relationship between the responsibilities of the Minister of 
National Defence and of the Canadian Armed Forces for the protection of sovereignty, and 
the responsibilities vested by statute in other ministers and departments and agencies 
reporting to them", ever precisely specified (Arnell and Anderson, 1971, pp. 31-32). 
What impacted most upon the Navy's ability to fulfil any of its rôles was funding; the 
defence budget was frozen in the early 1970s. Apart from the four DDH-280s destroyers, 
then just entering the fleet, no new acquisitions were planned. The lone aircraft carrier was 
sold for scrap and its Tracker aircraft assigned to land bases. If the government was going to 
follow the logic of the 1971 White Paper, then more maritime forces would be needed in 
order to provide surveillance of Canada's maritime approaches. Further equipment, though, 
would be geared toward the non-military sovereignty protection rôles, and be less 
sophisticated (and costly per unit) than forces needed to fulfil collective defence 
responsibilities. This seemed to be where the Trudeau government was moving when it 
initially considered replacing the 36 Argus long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRPAs) with 
an aircraft lacking modernized ASW capabilities. In 1976, however, it purchased 18 Auroras, 
a version of the American P3 with a sophisticated ASW package. And in 1977, Cabinet 
accepted the Navy's proposai to operate a fleet of 24 fully capable surface ships. In June 
1983, contracts were awarded for six City class frigates. 
With regard to the Navy, as with other branches, collective defence and especially 
NATO commitments had quickly re-emerged as the driving force behind Canadian defence 
spending as a resuit of the Defence Structure Review (DSR) conducted in 1974-75. The 
DSR made "combat capability" and "hard operational needs" the major déterminants in 
force structure development (Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 1989, p. 39). DND argued that 
"because the more military demanding rôles usually subsume the capabilities for less 
demanding activities and commitments [...] priority must be given to the rôles of defending 
North America in conjunction with U.S. forces, and the collective defence of the NATO 
area". The Navy placed particular stress on the NATO rôles when it assigned the "highest 
priority" to obtaining approval for a second batch of six frigates in 1984. It argued that the 
"shortfall of surface combatants has been the most crucial deficiency of NATO's maritime 
forces" (Canada, 1984, pp. 8A:6, 12). 
This renewed emphasis upon NATO maritime rôles in the late seventies and early 
1980s, was in line with the heightened importance which the Alliance itself was attaching to 
its collective naval forces. The adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967 had 
expanded the rôle of conventional forces in deterrence, which in turn meant that security of 
the Atlantic SLOC for reinforcement and resupply, a long-standing Canadian rôle, had 
assumed a higher priority. At the same time, the expansion of Soviet naval capabilities 
presented a greater challenge to NATO's confidence in being able to secure use of the seas 
in the event of war. 
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Allied Stratégie considérations or even the requirements of the Canadian Navy would 
hâve been insufficient to persuade the Trudeau government to support a NATO-oriented 
maritime building program. Whatwas crucial was that Canada wanted to continue to 
participate in the Alliance: consequently maritime forces, along with the land and air forces 
in Germany, were still required as part of the price Ottawa had to pay to secure its seat at the 
table. Canada had a one océan fleet because it was the only kind of Navy the political 
leadership was prepared to fund. No other rationale, not even protection of sovereignty, 
could persuade the government to spend money on the maritime forces. As it was, at sea, 
as on land and in the air, the Trudeau government spent only as much as it felt it had to in 
order to maintain some semblance of effectiveness and to partially satisfy the requests of its 
allies. 
By the early 1980s, the "commitment-capability gap" which a spécial joint committee of 
the House of Commons and the Senate had identified as the "fundamental issue in defence 
policy" (Canada, 1986, p. 48) was particularly pronounced with regard to maritime forces. 
Although the Auroras had improved aerial ASW, delays in the CFP program meant that by 
the mid-1990s the country would hâve only ten modem surface ships while it subsurface 
capabilities still consisted of three 1960s vintage conventional submarines. The gap was 
most notable with regard to Canada's allied commitments, but because the naval forces 
used to fulfil collective defence rôles were also tasked with sovereignty obligations, thèse 
could not be assured either. As a Senate committee report observed in 1983: "MARCOM, 
which is responsible for the country's seaward defence, cannot meet its commitments to the 
protection of Canadian sovereignty, to the defence of North America-much less to NATO" 
(Canada, 1983, p. 2). 
THE 1987 WHITE PAPER AND BEYOND 
It was the daim of the 1987 White Paper on defence that it would close the 
commitment-capability gap, especially with regard to the Navy. In light of récent dramatic 
events in international relations and the Mulroney govemment's décision to reduce defence 
spending and abandon the SSN program, it is tempting to simply dismiss the whole 
document as anachronistic, strategically ill conceived and financially unsound. But the 
controversy and debate generated by the White Paper's naval proposais not only reveals 
much about Canadian maritime interests but can be useful when considering the future of 
Navy. 
Like the Brock Report, the 1987 White Paper stressed the need for a more balanced 
fleet, one capable of meeting a variety of sea-based threats, not simply the traditional 
challenge to NATO's Atlantic sea lines of communication. Canada had growing économie, 
cultural and political interests in the Pacific while the Arctic, which had once been a buffer 
between the superpowers, "could, according to the White Paper, become a battleground". 
There was also the potential threat posed by Soviet Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles 
(SLCMs). Although fundamentally still an ASW force, this new Navy would hâve had more 
balance in terms of where it operated, (in ail three océans), and in terms of the mix of 
weapons. There were to be ten to 12 SSNs and 16 surface ships (the 4 Tribals, the 6 frigates 
under construction plus 6 more). Had the government maintained the NATO orientation of 
the past, it would hâve proposed more surface ships, for as DND argued in 1984, the 
Alliance was most in need of thèse forces. 
The White Paper's maritime proposais were also very reminiscent of the early Trudeau 
emphasis upon sovereignty protection. With a more balanced and diversified fleet, Canada 
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would be able to patrol and enforce its sovereignty over a much wider océan area. Unlike the 
1971 White Paper, though, the 1987 document did not view the sovereignty problem 
primarily in non-military terms. Unless Canada had the ability to provide better maritime 
surveillance against an increasing sea-based threat to North America, the U.S. Navy would 
be compelled to heighten its opérations in Canadian waters, especially in the Arctic and in 
waters for which Canada was responsible. Given past practice, as in the Pacific, Ottawa 
could not be assured of being kept fully informed of USN activities. Thus the new Navy, 
notably the SSNs, would enhance Canadian sovereignty by providing the basis for greater 
naval coopération. As the Minister declared when he tabled the White Paper: "Some people 
would suggest that we contract out the defence of Canada to others. The Government is 
prepared to discuss coopération in ail aspects of the defence of North America. But we will 
not allow Canada's sovereignty to be compromised. We will be a partner with our allies and 
not a dépendent" (Beatty, 1987, p. 10). Ottawa hoped to convince its allies that Canada 
could contribute more to collective defence at sea by having forces better suited to meet 
new maritime stratégie challenges to North America. 
The argument never worked. Although Président Reagan eventually agreed to 
recommend to Congress that it approve the transfer of certain technologies to Canada in 
the event Ottawa selected a British submarine, from the American and European 
perspective the White Paper's naval proposais, especially the SSNs, were primarily 
motivated by narrow Canadian national interests. Reflecting the gênerai assessment within 
the U.S. government The Washington Post saw the SSNs as sovereignty weapons to be 
used for missions of Canada's own choosing, not those of its allies, while Britain's 
Economist described them as an "artic antic" directed against the United States thus 
appealing to the "anti-American plasma that flows through many Canadian veins" 
(Sokolsky, 1989b, p. 283). 
In the domestic political arena, the government had difficulty persuading the press, 
stratégie analysts and the gênerai public of the stratégie rationale for the SSNs. Were 
nuclear-submarines the best ASW weapons for Canada? What would the Navy do if it found 
a Soviet SSN under the ice? Thèse weapons would draw Canada into the provocative and 
destabilizing "forward maritime strategy" of the USN. Was not arms control, especially for 
SLCMs, the better solution to the new sea-based threats facing North America? 
Increasingly DND was compelled to rely on the sovereignty argument, as opposed to 
the stratégie rationales, to combat faltering support for the SSN program. But it was no more 
successful hère. What good were SSNs in the protection of the environment or enforcing 
Canadian fishing quotas? As for the problem of U.S. submarines using the Arctic, thèse 
were expensive flags to wave and unlikely to persuade Washington to agrée to Ottawa's 
daim that the Northwest Passage lay within internai Canadian waters. As the Trudeau 
government had found, sovereignty against non-military threats was insufficient grounds for 
spending vast sums on naval forces. Nor did the other rationales for an expanded Navy 
appear convincing or persuasive enough to justify the costs. For example, while it was true 
that Canada's interests were and should be expanding in the Pacific rim, there were no 
trans-oceanic security ties that could provide a political rationale for more forces. With 
regard to économie links, for Canada the flag had never preceded nor followed trade. It was 
difficult to argue that Japan or the newly industrialized nations of the région would be more 
accommodating to Canada simply because it put more maritime forces on its Pacific coasts. 
After ail, the large American naval présence and security guarantees seemed to hâve little 
impact on Japan's économie policy towards the United States. 
In sum, having tumed away from the traditional Atlantic-NATO orientation, the maritime 
plans of the 1987 White Paper lacked the crucial political underpinnings that had been the 
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basis for the posture and deployment of the Canadian Navy. Sophisticated ASW forces at 
sea, as with the land and air forces in Europe, were viewed as part of the price Canada was 
prepared to pay for participation in the Alliance. That thèse forces could also be used for 
North American maritime defence and sovereignty rôles was an additional, but not primary, 
reason for maintaining them. When the worsening budgetary situation at home and the 
improving stratégie situation abroad sunk the new balanced fleet, Canada was left with the 
one océan fleet it had since the Cold War. Indeed, the NATO posture of the Navy was the 
only aspect to be strengthened during the short-life of the White Paper. Early on, in 
December 1987, the Mulroney government awarded the contract for six additional CPFs. 
The problem is that doubts are being raised conceming the necessity of even this fleet. 
A Navy whose primary justification continues to be its relevance to Canadian stratégie and 
political interests in European security cannot but be subjected to questions given the rapid 
dismantling of the Soviet threat to NATO. What need can there be to maintain forces for the 
protection of allied Atlantic SLOCs for the reinforcement and resupply of a conventional 
land war in Europe? And, in view of the increasing Europeanization of NATO, what can 
Canada hope to gain politically from continuing to concentrate its maritime forces in the 
Atlantic? 
However, such doubts are not unique to the Navy. The ground and air forces in 
Germany face a somewhat more uncertain future. In fact, depending on how NATO will 
evolve in the coming years, Canada's one océan fleet may well be in better position to ride-
out current changes in the international security environment. The now projected core force 
of 16 surface ships plus the 18 Auroras represents in numbers about what Canada has been 
contributing to collective defence at sea for the last twenty years. The ships being replaced 
were seen as being insufficient to meet maritime defence rôles. This modem fleet, although 
not larger in numbers, may now be more suited to the international stratégie environment. In 
addition, the August 1990 décision to send three ships into the Persian Gulf brought the 
current fleet's poor condition and lack of modem capabilities to the public's attention. 
If the Alliance maintains its basic structure, including an Atlantic Command and the 
Soviets do not entirely disband their navy, the security of the seas between North America 
and Europe will remain an allied concern. At présent, given trends in conventional arms 
control, it is likely that American forces will remain in Europe, although in significantly 
reduced numbers. This will place greater emphasis on reinforcement capabilities. With the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the United States now estimâtes that it will 
hâve more warning time in the event of a Soviet mobilization which in tum places greater 
reliance upon sealift for reinforcement as opposed to airlift. Thus the relative importance of 
the Atlantic SLOC may actually increase in NATO strategy. To this extent, NATO may still be 
looking to Canada to continue to supply ASW convoy escort forces. 
Whatever the future structure of NATO, it is likely that Ottawa will want to remain 
involved in European security matters if only to continue to avoid having only bilatéral 
defence ties with the United States. At the same time budgetary and/or public opinion 
pressure may make it necessary to significantly reduce or entirely withdraw Canada's land 
and air forces from Germany. From a political standpoint, Ottawa might find it advantageous 
to maintain the maritime commitment to the Alliance as a means of sustaining its links with 
Europe. And, as demonstrated by the deployment to the Persian Gulf, naval forces, 
although geared for NATO rôles, hâve a flexibility that makes them suitable for other 
diplomatie and conflict contingencies. 
Concentrating the Canadian contribution to NATO in the maritime sphère would also 
hâve the advantage of continuing to provide Canada with forces useful in North American 
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defence rôles and maritime sovereignty protection. The Stratégie Arms Réduction Talks 
(START) are moving towards cutting superpower offensive nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. 
This will still leave SSBN and SLCM threats to North America. The Soviets hâve also been 
pressing for limitations on naval forces, including attack submarines. Even if limits are 
placed on naval forces, though, both superpowers will retain substantial fleets of SSNs and 
thus the United States will continue to monitor the seaward approaches to the continent. To 
be sure, improvements in the international political climate coupled with arms control will 
moderate the sea-based threat to North America. But since stratégie maritime defence has 
never been a priority for the USN, the future may not be that much différent from the past. 
The United States will look to Canada to contribute to surveillance activities in the Atlantic 
but will make no new demands. 
From the standpoint of sovereignty protection against non-military threats and of 
reducing the need for U.S. forces to operate in waters for which Canada is responsible, it will 
be up to the Canadian government to décide if more forces are needed. This will dépend 
upon what level of présence Ottawa wishes to maintain at sea and in the Arctic. Some 
forces hâve been shifted to the Pacific. In the summer of 1989, the Mulroney government 
announced the aquisition of three LRPAs primarily for sovereignty purposes (the kinds of 
aircraft the Trudeau government rejected) but in the February 1990 budget it cancelled 
plans for an icebreaker. As regards to under-ice submarine capabilities, the Minister of 
Defence stated that, "We hâve been a country for 127 years and haven't been able to go 
under the ice yet" (Chepesiuk, 1990, p. 23). Research continues on ocean-floor sensors for 
certain Arctic straits. A décision will also hâve to be made about a replacement for the 
Trackers whose mission may be privatized. With expectations of major cuts in the defence 
budget, new equipment of this kind may not be fortheoming and Canada will continue to task 
forces geared for allied rôles for non-military sovereignty protection. However, some 
savings from a reduced land and air rôle in Europe might be directed to maritime forces. 
Whatever the spécifie composition of the naval posture, the Canadian Navy will remain 
an unbalanced, one océan Atlantic fleet. This will be so because Canada's maritime 
interests in the Pacific and the Arctic are not important enough in a foreign or domestic 
policy context as to require modem naval forces. Geography has made Canada a three 
océan nation, strategy and politics however dictate that its naval activities will continue to be 
concentrated in only one of them. 
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